





















detection   technology.   Network   intrusion   detection 
systems   (NIDSs   or   simply   IDSs)   are   quickly 
becoming   a   crucial   part   of   the   Internet   security 
infrastructure.
Back  in  March 2001,   there was a media  furore[1] 
when   the   FBI   Internet   crime   division   issued   a 
warning   concerning   the   then   unreleased   Stick[2] 
program   which   “essentially   disarms   intrusion 
detection   systems.”   The   tool   automated  what  we 
shall call the alert flood attack.
The   attack  works   because   each   time   an   intrusion 
detection system raises an alert it must make some 
attempt   to   communicate   the   information   to   an 
operator. This communication channel can therefore 
become   the   target   of   a   denial   of   service   attack 
because,  like all  communication channels,   it  has a 
finite   capacity.   If   this   channel   can   become 







for   reducing   false   positive   alarms   generally.  One 
such technique is alert correlation. The aim of alert 
correlation   is   to   analyse   the   alert   stream   and 
discover strategies or  attack scenarios using some 
kind   of  model   of   possible   attacker   strategies[4]. 
One   quite   intuitive   type   of   model   is   an   attack 
graph[5,6,7].   The   advantage   of     this   kind   of 
correlation is that alerts which do not (yet) conform 
to a threatening attack strategy are not displayed.
We   propose   a   novel   algorithm   to   protect  NIDSs 
from   alert­flooding   attacks.   The   algorithm 
combines   a   throttling   algorithm,   namely   a   token 





inform   the   throttling   algorithm   so   that   they   key 
alerts which make up threatening strategies are not 
dropped by the sensor.
The   next   section   of   this   paper   will   present   the 
relevant   background   for   the   proposed   techniques. 
The   alert   flood   attack   is   defined   and   current 
approaches are examined. The real­time correlation 
algorithm   our   solution   is   based   on   is   also 
introduced.   In   section   3,   a   modified   correlation 
algorithithm   is   presented   which   uses   throttling 
techniques to curb alert flood attacks. In section 4 
some   experimental   data   is   presented   in   order   to 
demonstrate the effectiveness of our technique. We 






a   database   of   known   attack   patterns   (also   called 
signatures). An example of a signature is shown in 
Listing 1. This signature alerts on traffic generated 
by   the   well­known   “BackOrifice”   trojan   horse 
program and detects any incoming packets destined 
to   user   datagram   protocol   (UDP)   port   31337, 
containing   a   specific   sequence  of   bytes  anywhere 
within its payload.
alert udp $EXTERNAL_NET any ->
 $HOME_NET 31337 (msg:"BACKDOOR  
 BackOrifice access";






the IDS will   recognise as  true attacks.  Taking the 




The   possible   ramifications   of   this   type   of   attack 
against an IDS are threefold:
1. Sensor   storage   becomes   full,   preventing 
further logging.
2. Sensor exceeds maximum alert throughput, 
causing   alerts   to  be   lost,   or   the   sensor   to 
cease functioning.
3. The   analyst   becomes   deluged   with   false 
information   and   becomes   unable   to 
distinguish real attacks from the false ones.
Because of   this,  attackers may use  the alert   flood 





freely available  Snort   [10]   IDS.  Each  packet  sent 
could also have crucial   fields  such as source and 




Alert   floods can also be exacerbated by  the  poor 
alerting performance of IDS systems in general. A 
quick examination of the Snort system reveals that, 




in   added   system   call   overhead   for   every   logged 
alert.
Performance   in   this   area   can   be   understandably 
overlooked by the IDS system designer.  After all, 
good engineering practice  tells  us   to optimise  for 




Perhaps   the   simplest   way   to   reduce   data   output 
while   maintaining   the   same   intrusion   detection 
capability   is   to  make  minor  modifications   to   the 
signatures to make sure that the IDS is as terse as 






tune   signatures   to   examine   only   those   packets 
destined   for   the   relevant   hosts.   Let   us   consider 
BIND,   DNS   server   software   infamous   for   its 
security   vulnerabilities.   In   this   situation,   the 
signatures may be modified to only look for BIND 
exploits   if   the   destination   address   on   the   packet 
matches   a   pre­defined   list   of   DNS   servers.   Of 




the   false  negative   side.   Interestingly   this  problem 
also   comes   up  when   designing   attack   graph   for 
correlation algorithms.
The  Snort   team  addressed   the   problems   of  wide 
spread   proliferation   of   automated   alert   flooding 
tools like Stick and Snot in their 1.8 release. Their 
solution was to implement a Transmission Control 






three   segments,   rather   than   just   one.   More 





Currently  most  systems keep   track  of  TCP states. 
This is mainly to protect against desynchronisation 
attacks   such   as   those   described   by   Ptacek   and 
Newsham[3], but there is also the additional benefit 
of  making  sure   that   there   is  no  such  short  cut   in 
carrying   out   an   alert   flooding   attack.   Further   to 
performing TCP state tracking, it is also possible to 
track   any   application   layer   state,   enabling   us   to 




state   information   as   some  exploits   can   exist   as   a 
single packet   (i.e.  statelessly);  or  because  in other 
cases, they work over inherently stateless protocols. 







where  rate   limiting  has  been  needed.  Some  good 
examples are:
1. Network   bandwidth   management 
systems[11].





4. Flood   protection   for   programs   that   log 
externally generated events such as UNIX 
syslog.


















networking   and   security   specialist.   Intrusion  alert 




information   about   threatening   attack   strategies   to 
other specialists. The basic idea is that vertices in 
the  graph  represent   some vulnerability  and  edges 
represent   ordering   constraints   between   the 




intrusion   alerts   together,   based   on   the   strategic 
relationship between the alerts. In order to do this 
intrusion   alerts  must   be   related   to  vertices   in   the 
attack   graphs.   In   this  way   the   role   of   the  NIDS 




We focus on  this approach as it  runs  in real­time, 
this   is   necessary   since   our   approach   relies   on 





(QG)   is   introduced.   In   order   to   avoid   keeping 
unnessecary alerts in memory, only the latest alert 
seen   for   a   given   exploit   vertex   is   stored   in   this 
structure. That is to say that the correlation between 
such matching alerts is left as implicit. This limits 
the amount of  data  that  needs  to be kept   in  main 
memory and allows the algorithm to be run with a 
finite amount of memory while avoiding the naive 
sliding  correlation  window approach  which  would 




vertices,   security   conditions   and   exploits   (see 
Figure 2). Exploit vertices are (vuln,src,dst) tuples. 
The src and dst fields are used to tie the exploit to 
specific  combinations of  vulnerable  and attacking 
hosts, wildcards may be used. These vertices may 
represent   one   or   more   possible   alert   types.  A 
function “f” is introduced which maps alerts to an 
exploit vertices in the attack graph.
Security   conditions   vertices   refer   to   prerequisites 
and   consequences   of   exploits.   Thus   edges 
connecting a condition to an exploit are prerequisite 
relations   and   those   connecting   an   exploit   to   a 
condition   are   consequence   relations.   All 
prerequisites   for  an  alert  must  be  satisfied  before 
the exploit is considered possible. The addition of 
security  constraints   in   to   the  attack  graph   allows 
exploits   to   have   either   disjunctive   or   conjunctive 
relationships depending on the construction of the 
attack graph. This property is illustrated in Figure 3, 
in which a successful exploit  against   the sadmind 
server   leads   to   the   same   consequence   as   an 
equivalent   attack   against   the   sendmail   server, 
namely a compromise of root privileges.
Figure   2.   An   attack   graph   featuring   exploits 
(circles) and security conditions (squares).
Attack   graphs   are   generated   automatically   with 





vulnerability­centric.   That   is   to   say   it   will   not 
correlate   exploits   against  machines  which   are   not 
defined as being vulnerable to them. These graphs 
are distinct from those   used by Ning et al in that 
they   contain   not   just   the   causal   relationships 






Alerts   are   placed   in   their   requisite   queue   and   a 
breadth first search is performed in the graph to find 
previous   exploits  which  would   correlate  with   the 
current one. If a queue is found and is non­empty 
then a correlation is generated. If a queue is empty, 




If   the  edges  in   the graph are directed forwards  in 
time,   rather   than   backwards,   predictions   can   be 
generated in much the same way as correlations.
The QG structure is actually an enhanced version of 
the   attack   graph   which   avoids   the   need   for 















We   have   described   the   alert   flood   attack   in   the 
previous   sections   as   fundamentally   a   resource 
exhaustion attack. In this section we will outline an 
approach   to   reduce   exposure   to   the   attack   by 
combining   alert   throttling   with   attack   graph 
correlation.
Consider   the  case  of  a  human IDS operator  as  a 
resource   that   cannot   cope  withhaving   to  examine 
many thousands of bogus alerts at the rate at which 
a sustained attack can produce them.






length   of   time   it   seems   rather  more   complex   to 
scale the human operator.
Taking   the  approach  of  minimising   the   resources 
required, alert data could be reduced by throttling 
the   alert   stream   to   a   fixed   rate.   This   could   be 
achieved by applying a token bucket filter either per 








algorithm   to   interpose   between   the   signature 
matching,  and output  components of   the IDS. By 






compression   technique   which   replaces   recurring 
sequences   of   symbols   (called   runs)  with   a   single 








to   add   a   counter   to   the   queues   in   the  QG   data 







already  defining  what   is   relevant   to   identifying   a 
threatening strategy and so the loss is acceptable, if 
not always desirable.




For   those   alerts  which   do   not  map   in   to   exploit 
nodes, we cannot be sure that we are missing alerts 
vital  to some, as yet undefined strategy. Since the 
QG   algorithm   assumes   a   complete   attack   graph 






drop   all   implicitly   correlating   alerts   and  keep   the 
same strategies. However it is seen as a benefit  to 
keep  alerts  where  possible,  here  we  envisage   that 






system   running   off­line   against   a   tcpdump[17] 
capture   file   containing   an   alert   flood   attack 




the  alerts   in   the   file  may form  the  initial   step   in 
possible   scenarios.  To   capture   this   feature  of   the 
data   we   create   exploit   vertices   for   each   host 
attacked.   Some   sensible   consequences   are   added 
based on expert knowledge so that the correlation 
algorithm can be more fully exercised.
We  perform 2   tests   and   in  both,  we  have   a   full 
signature database loaded containing around 1,600 
signatures, with the network data read directly from 






QG   algorithm.   The   second   run   (#2)   is   identical 







a  burst   of   20  alerts.  These  parameters  are   rather 
arbitrary   but   are   probably   best   set   based   on   the 
operators experience of   the baseline  alert   rate  for 
the network.




1 475,229 300,741 13.131 18.476





time.  While   the   run  time was  reduced by around 
30%,  the CPU time only reduced by around 10%. 
This   indicates   that   the   Firestorm   process   is   not 
wasting  as  much  time waiting   for   I/O  completion 
when the token bucket filter is enabled,
The number of alerts output is reduced by orders of 





network   adding   further   latency   and   bandwidth 
constraints.   In   these   deployments  we   expect   even 
greater gains in performance.
From these results it is shown that we can effectively 
boost   performance   and   therefore   sensor   capacity, 
allowing the IDS to carry on working during an alert 






Alert   flooding   is   a   problem   that   will   probably 
always   exist  with   intrusion  detection   systems   and 
one that cannot be eliminated entirely. However, we 
have shown that it is possible to drastically reduce 
the effects  by  recognising an attack and  throttling 
excess alerts.
We   have   further   shown   that   real­time   alert 
correlation   algorithms   can   be   used   to  provide   a 
useful   context   for   throtting   alerts   such   that   key 
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